Humpty Dumpty on Mens Rea Standards: A Proposed Methodology for Interpretation by Tromble, Katherine R.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 52 
Issue 2 Issue 2 - March 1999 Article 6 
3-1999 
Humpty Dumpty on Mens Rea Standards: A Proposed 
Methodology for Interpretation 
Katherine R. Tromble 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Katherine R. Tromble, Humpty Dumpty on Mens Rea Standards: A Proposed Methodology for 
Interpretation, 52 Vanderbilt Law Review 521 (1999) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol52/iss2/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Humpty Dumpty on Mens Rea Standards: A
Proposed Methodology for Interpretation
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 522
II. THE CONFUSED STATE OF MENS REA LAW IN
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES ............................. 526
A. A Review of the Court's Presumption in
Favor of Mens Rea ................................................. 526
B. "Knowingly" as an Explicit Mens Rea
Standard ................................................................ 527
1. Pre-Liparota ............................................... 527
2. Liparota v. United States ........................... 529
3. Post-Liparota .............................................. 530
C. "Knowingly" as an Implied Mens Rea
Standard ................................................................ 533
1. Pre-Staples v. United States ...................... 533
2. Staples v. United States: The Implied
Mens Rea Counterpart to Liparota ........... 535
3. Post-Staples ................................................ 537
D. The "Willfully" Mens Rea Standard ...................... 538
III. A QUASI-PLAIN MEANING APPROACH ................................ 539
A. The Case Against Linguists and
M athematicians ..................................................... 539
B. Two Fundamentals of Criminal Law: Lenity
and N otice .............................................................. 541
C. A Quasi-Plain Meaning Approach? .......................  545
1. How the Approach Operates ...................... 545
2. Why a Quasi-Plain Meaning Approach
is N ecessary ................................................ 548
IV. IS A CONSISTENT ANALYSIS OF MENS REA ISSUES
IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES POSSIBLE? ..........................  550




"When I use a word.., it means just what I choose it to
mean-neither more nor less.",
This statement by Humpty Dumpty sets forth the argument of
this Note: words used to describe mens rea in federal criminal stat-
utes have plain, ordinary meanings. When the United States
Supreme Court interprets these statutes, it should do so according to
the words' plain meanings. Because the Court has not used this
approach in past cases, the law of mens rea on the federal level is
confusing and inconsistent.
The Court has tried to repair poorly drafted statutes by inter-
preting them in various ways to achieve what it thought was the cor-
rect result. By applying different interpretation techniques, however,
the Court has developed an ad hoc mens rea jurisprudence that
confuses people about what mental state is necessary for conviction
under federal criminal laws. People thus cannot order their affairs to
avoid violating the law. To clarify the law, the United States
Congress and the Supreme Court should engage in a law-making
dialogue that results in Congress drafting clearer statutes and the
Court interpreting those statutes according to the words' plain
meanings.
The Supreme Court's mens rea analysis in federal criminal
cases is least settled in cases involving the "knowingly" standard.
The Court apparently interprets other mens rea standards, such as
"willfully," "purposely," and "recklessly," consistently. The Court has
more difficulty interpreting "knowingly," because it falls in the middle
of the mens rea standard hierarchy.2 "Willfully," the most stringent
1. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND AND TiROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS 159 (J.M.
Dent & Sons Ltd. 1978) (1865) (emphasis in original).
2. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1980) (setting forth the mens rea hierarchy:
"purposely;" "wilfiflly;" "knowingly;" "recklessly;" and "negligently"). In contrast to the Court's
ad hoc approach to defining "knowingly," the Model Penal Code attempts to define the term
precisely:
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the
element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware
that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element
involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct
will cause such a result.
Id. § 2.02(b). For a discussion of the confusion created by the Court's haphazard interpretations,
see 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS
123 (1970) (decrying the federal courts' "confused and inconsistent ad hoc approach" to the mens
rea issue).
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standard, implies either a full understanding of both the law and the
facts3 or an understanding of egregious facts that indicate the
defendant knew she was doing something wrong.4 "Recklessly," one of
the lowest standards, implies very little thought.5 "Knowingly,"
however, indicates a standard somewhere above recklessness and
below fully-informed thwarting of the law. Determining exactly what
it means to act knowingly appears to be difficult for the Court.6
Although the Court has consistently defined "knowingly" to
require that the defendant actually knew he committed. the acts that
made his conduct criminal, 7 the Court applies this definition only if
doing so will allow the Court to reach its desired result .8 For instance,
when the Court hears a case involving a statute that criminalizes
morally suspect behavior, 9 it defines "knowingly" to require only that
3. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2214 (1997) (stating
that "a defendant may not be imprisoned for violating Rule 10b-5 [willfully violating the
Securities and Exchange Act] if he proves that he had no knowledge of the rule"); Cheek v.
United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (defining "willfully" as "'the voluntary, intentional
violation of a known legal duty'") (quoting United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976)
(per curiam)).
4. See, e.g., Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 341 (1941) (stating that "willfly"
can be demonstrated through a defendant's understanding of his actions, and does not neces-
sarily require understanding that those actions are unlawful); Potter v. United States, 155 U.S.
438, 446 (1894) (same).
5. Cf Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 114 n.9 (1989) (affirming the defendant's conviction
for possessing child pornography based on a recklessness standard).
6. Compare Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952) (defining
"knowingly" as knowledge of the existence of a safer route, not of the law), with Liparota v.
United States, 471 U.S. 419, 422 n.3 (1985) (requiring knowledge of the law in addition to
knowledge of the facts making the action unlawful).
7. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 622 n.3 (1994) ("The mens rea pre-
sumption requires knowledge only of the facts that make the defendant's conduct illegal, lest it
conflict with the related presumption, 'deeply rooted in the American legal system,' that, ordi-
narily, 'ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution.'") (citing
Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 404
(1980) (stating that "he is said to act knowingly if he is aware 'that that result is practically
certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result'" (quoting
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978))); United States v.
International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971) (stating that the Court will not
"attribute to Congress the inaccurate view that that Act [18 U.S.C. § 834] requires proof of
knowledge of the law, as well as the facts, and that it intended to endorse that interpretation by
retaining the word knowingly' ").
8. See, e.g., Liparota, 471 U.S. at 422 n.3 (finding that to prove a defendant knowingly
used, transferred, acquired, altered, or possessed food stamps illegally, the government must
show that the defendant knowingly acted contrary to the law and knew the law forbid his
action). Compare United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 68 (1984) (concluding that "knowingly"
applied only to the clause preceding it and not also to the jurisdictional element), with United
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 77 (1994) (holding that even though a natural
reading of the statute would not extend "knowingly" to the age of the performer, the Court
would extend the modifier).
9. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994), which criminalizes certain types of lying:
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the defendant knew he acted, regardless of whether the defendant
knew those actions were illegal.1o In cases that involve statutes that
may be read as criminalizing otherwise innocent conduct,"1 the Court
defines "knowingly" to mean that the defendant knew the facts about
his or her actions and that those actions were illegal.32
In this latter set of cases, the Court allows ignorance of the law
to be a defense to criminal liability even though one of the basic prem-
ises of criminal law is that people are presumed to know the law.
Valid reasons why the Court requires knowledge of the law in certain
cases include: not requiring it would criminalize too much behaviors
or would result in the statute being unconstitutional.14  The Court
thus preserves statutes by interpreting their mens rea requirements
in an ad hoc rather than a consistent manner. At the same time, the
Court leaves a patchwork of precedent that results in no fixed law on
which the Court, lower courts, or lay people can rely for guidance
about how the "knowingly" mens rea standard will be interpreted in
federal criminal cases.
A survey of the mens rea issues that have come before the
Court in federal criminal cases in the last ten years shows the unset-
tled state of the law. This case law demonstrates that the Court ap-
Whoever... knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any [materially] false, fictitious or fraudu-
lent statements or representations, or... makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any [materially] false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or
entry, shall be fined [not more than $10,000] or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
10. See, e.g., Yermian, 468 U.S. at 74 (holding that the mental element of the statute re-
quired only proof of "intentional and deliberate lies"); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
276 (1952) (holding that "knowingly convert[s]" requires criminal intent to take the casings, but
does not require knowledge of the statute).
11. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1994) (imposing strict registration requirements on
all firearms). Presumably, owning a firearm is generally an innocent act because the
Constitution preserves the right to bear arms for all Americans. See U.S. CONST. amend. II.
12. See, e.g., Staples, 511 U.S. at 622 n.3 (reading "knowingly" into the statute and then
defining the word to require knowledge of the registration requirements as well as of the fact
that the gun was not registered).
13. For instance, the Court in Staples, 511 U.S. at 622-23, stated that the defendant could
only violate the registration law if he knew he had to register his particular firearm because
most guns do not require such stringent registration procedures. Thus, the average person
might not know that he had an obligation to register a particular weapon. Further, in Liparota
v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 422-23 (1985), the Court required "knowingly" to encompass
knowledge of the laws regulating food stamp usage because it felt that, otherwise, people who
made innocent mistakes when using their food stamps would be prosecuted.
14. In United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 77 (1994), the Court extended
the word "kmowingly" to apply to all elements of the offense even though that was not the
natural way to read the statute. Otherwise, the statute would criminalize the transportation of
all pornography and therefore unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment guarantee of
free speech.
524
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plies a variety of definitions to the word "knowingly" and that it ap-
proaches mens rea issues inconsistently.1 In some circumstances, the
Court looks at legislative history to try and determine the
congressional intent behind a statute. 6 In others, the Court relies on
the text to determine the statute's meaning. 7 This lack of consistent
interpretation is disturbing because it prevents people from knowing
what the law is and adjusting their behavior accordingly.'8
This Note will address the confusion the Court has created
with regard to mens rea issues in federal criminal cases, and propose
a methodology that would clarify the law in this area. The Court
should adopt a version of the plain meaning approach that (1) looks at
the natural meaning of the words in the statute and (2) applies a
broad rule of lenity.
Part II will discuss the unsettled state of Supreme Court mens
rea law in federal criminal cases by focusing on the mental state
"knowingly." Part III will then describe the quasi-plain meaning
analytical framework proposed by this Note. Finally, Part IV will
return to the cases discussed in Part II and demonstrate how the
proposed method would clarify the law in federal criminal cases.
Clarification of federal law will enable the public to know what
conduct the law prohibits so that individuals may order their affairs
accordingly.
15. Compare Liparota, 471 U.S. at 422 (stating that in order to be convicted defendant
must know he is violating the law), and Staples, 511 U.S. at 622 (holding that the defendant
must know the statute required registration of the firearm), with Moskal v. United States, 498
U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (requiring only that the defendant knows he altered a car title to be con-
victed), and Posters 'N Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 524 (1994) (holding that a
defendant must know that the items sold are likely to be used with illegal drugs, but not that
the items are "drug paraphernalia" within the meaning of the statute).
16. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities For a Greater Oregon, 515
U.S. 687, 696 n.9 (1995) (discussing the significance of Congress's changing the mens rea re-
quirement from "willfully" to "knowingly" in 1978 in order to make violation of the Endangered
Species Act a "general rather than specific intent crime" (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-1804,
at 26 (1978))).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 489-99 (1997) (holding that there is no
materiality requirement to convict under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 for making false statements to an
FDIC-insured institution because the text of the statute requires only making a false statement,
not making a material false statement).
18. One of the law's main functions is prediction. To determine if the law accomplishes
this function, one must "look at [the law] as a bad man, who cares only for the material conse-
quences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons
for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience."
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). In looking at
federal criminal law as a "bad man," one cannot tell what conduct is legal and what is illegal;
hence this law fails its predictive function.
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II. THE CONFUSED STATE OF MENS REA LAW IN
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
A. A Review of the Court's Presumption in Favor
of Mens Rea
In order to understand the current state of mens rea law in
federal criminal cases, a survey of the law before 1985 is required.
The first principle the Supreme Court established regarding mens rea
in federal criminal statutes was a presumption in favor of mens rea
standards generally. In Morissette v. United States, the Court stated
that "[tihe contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion."19 Rather,
the Court noted, it is basic to our system of law. According to the
Court, individuals should only be prosecuted for the bad acts they
intend to commit.20  The Court found the need for mens rea
instinctive, and thus initially established a presumption in favor of
requiring mens rea elements in federal criminal statutes.
Subsequently, the Court altered this presumption in order to allow
Congress to explicitly eliminate the mens rea requirement from a
statute in particular circumstances. 2' The Court, however, generally
favors the inclusion of mens rea requirements. 22
Another fundamental principle of federal statutory criminal
law is the concept of notice. Because ignorance of the law is generally
not a defense to a federal indictment, the Court requires that
defendants have notice of the laws under which they are being
19. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,250 (1952).
20. See id.
21. See, e.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 47-48 (1996) (finding that states may
prevent juries from considering voluntary intoxication evidence when determining whether
defendant had the requisite mens rea to commit mm iler knowingly); Liljeberg v. Health Servs.
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859 (1988) (finding the plain meaning of the text explicit and
determining that Congress did not intend to require scienter for a violation of the statute
requiring judges to recuse themselves from a proceeding in which their impartiality might be
impaired).
22. In United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971), the Court again discussed the need
for a "vicious will" or mens rea in order to convict someone of a statutory crime. See also JAMES
MARSHALL, INTENTION - IN LAW AND SOCIETY 138 (1968):
In other words, for the happening to be criminal, the wish had to be to accomplish some-
thing criminal. So in discussing intent we may have wishes of two different characters:
one giving a basis for civil liability (the wish to take property not one's own), and an-




prosecuted.23 This requirement is based on the idea that it is
fundamentally unfair to prosecute people before they know they
might be subject to prosecution. In addition to a general presumption
in favor of having mens rea elements in criminal statutes, this
concept has continued to underlie the Court's analysis of mens rea
issues even when its interpretations of specific mens rea standards
(like "knowingly") have been inconsistent.
Upon these two premises, the Court has interpreted federal
criminal statutes involving the "knowingly" standard to mean knowl-
edge of one's actions or the probable results of those actions.24
Historically, the Court addressed mens rea issues related to the
"knowingly" standard consistently.25 Since Liparota v. United States,
however, the law has become schizophrenic.
B. "Knowingly" as an Explicit Mens Rea Standard
1. Pre-Liparota
Beginning with Boyce Motor Lines, the Court determined that
a knowing violation required factual knowledge of a defendant's ac-
tions rather than knowledge of the underlying law or regulation.26
The defendant in Boyce Motor Lines was charged with transporting
carbon bisulphide through the Holland Tunnel.27 Because the trans-
portation of explosives and inflammables had been regulated histori-
cally, the Court concluded that the defendant should have known to
choose a safer route.28 The defendant knowingly violated the regula-
tion because, despite his lack of knowledge of the regulation, the
defendant drove a truck laden with carbon bisulphide through a con-
23. See, e.g., Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952) (asserting
that any criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to (1) give the public notice of what type
of conduct is prohibited, (2) guide the judge in her application, and (3) allow the lawyer to de-
fend an individual charged with its violation).
24. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,444 (1978) (stating that
"knowledge of [the] probable consequences and having the requisite anticompetitive effects can
be a sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal liability").
25. See id. at 446 (defining "knowingly" to require knowledge of one's conduct and its
probable effects); United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 560-62
(1971) (defining "knowingly" to require only that the defendant chose the more dangerous route
and not that there was a regulation that prohibited taking that route); Boyce Motor Lines, 342
U.S. at 342 (same).
26. See Boyce Motor Lines, 342 U.S. at 342.
27. See id. at 339.
28. See id. at 342.
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gested traffic tunnel.29 Thus, the Court held that in order to know-
ingly violate a regulation prohibiting the transport of explosives or
inflammables over congested traffic routes, 0 the defendant needed to
know only that he chose the more dangerous route,31 not the specifics
of the regulation violated.
After its decision in Boyce Motor Lines, the Court addressed
the issue of what qualified as a knowing violation of a toxic chemicals
labeling regulation in United States v. International Minerals &
Chemical Corp.32 As in Boyce Motor Lines, the defendant in
International Minerals was convicted of a crime related to shipping
dangerous chemicals in interstate commerce. 33 The Court reviewed
the language of the statute, its legislative history, and precedent in
holding that the phrase "knowingly violate" required only knowledge
of the facts that made the conduct illegal. 4 The Court then deter-
mined that because ignorance of the law is generally not a defense to
criminal prosecution, no justification existed for finding that Congress
intended to require knowledge of the law for conviction.35 Therefore,
the government was not required to prove that the defendant had
knowledge of the law he violated.
In United States v. Yermian, the Court addressed the issue of
whether "knowingly" applied to all clauses in a statutory provision. 6
Yermian was convicted for making a false statement to the
Department of Defense because he failed to disclose that he had been
charged with mail fraud on a security questionnaire asking whether
he had ever been charged with a violation of the law.37 He also stated
that he was previously employed by two companies that had never
29. See id.
30. See id. at 339 n.3 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 835, which provided that "[wjhoever know-
ingly violates any such regulation [49 C.F.R. § 197.1(b)] shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both").
31. See Boyce Motor Lines, 342 U.S. at 342.
32. United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
33. See id. at 559.
34. See id. at 560-62.
35. See id. at 563. The Court "decline[d] to attribute to Congress the inaccurate view that
that Act require[d] proof of knowledge of the law, as well as the facts, and that it intended to
endorse that interpretation by retaining the word knowingly." Id.
36. See United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 68 (1984).
37. See id. at 65-66. Yermian was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994), which states:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements
or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to
contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined [not more
than $10,0001 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
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employed him.3 8 Because the statute prohibited making a false
statement to the federal government, the issue was whether the gov-
ernment had to prove Yermian knew he made a false statement
within the jurisdiction of a federal agency, or only that he knew he
made a false statement. To resolve this issue, the Court applied basic
grammar concepts to the statute's text and determined that "[alny
natural reading of section 1001 ... establish[ed] that the terms
'knowingly and willfully' modify only the making of 'false, fictitious or
fraudulent statements .... ' 39 The Court determined that the best
interpretation of the statute was to apply the most obvious reading to
its words and structure.4° Thus, the government had to prove only
that Yermian knew he made a false statement, not that he knew the
law prohibited making such statements to a federal agency.
After Boyce Motor Lines, International Minerals, and Yermian,
the Court seemed to establish that in order to find a defendant know-
ingly violated a statute or knowingly committed a crime, the govern-
ment had to prove only that the individual had knowledge of the un-
derlying facts and their likely consequences. What happened after
Yermian to the Court's analysis of statutes involving the "knowingly"
standard illustrates the confusion resulting from the Court's failure to
develop a consistent method for interpreting mens rea provisions.
2. Liparota v. United States
At issue in Liparota v. United States was how to interpret a
statute prohibiting an individual from knowingly using, transferring,
acquiring, altering, or possessing food stamps in an unauthorized
manner.41 After reviewing legislative history and finding little guid-
ance from Congress, the Court decided that "knowingly" applied not
only to the use and transfer of food stamps, but also to the way in
which the stamps were used or transferred.42 Thus, violators could
only be convicted under this statute if they knew they used or trans-
ferred food stamps and if they knew that the way in which they used
38. See Yermian, 468 U.S. at 65-66.
39. Id. at 69.
40. See id. at 74. The Court even comments that if this is not the reading Congress in-
tended, "it is for Congress and not this Court to amend the criminal statute." Id. at 75.
41. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 421 (1985). The statute in question provides
that "whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons, authorization
cards, or access devices in any manner contrary to this chapter or the regulations issued
pursuant to this chapter shall... be guilty ofa felony...." 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1994).
42. See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425.
1999] 529
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or transferred them was against the law.43 By adopting this definition
of "knowingly," the Court created an ignorance of the law defense for
people charged with food stamp fraud.4
The Court's holding in Liparota marked a departure from its
previous decisions, which held that knowingly violating a regulation
did not require actual knowledge of the law.4 Nonetheless, the Court
cited precedent to support its determination that knowledge of the
regulation was required.46 Although the Court, as it had in previous
cases, considered legislative history, the structure of the statute, and
the rule of lenity,47 it arrived at the opposite result. The inconsistency
must stem either from how the Court conducted these inquiries or
from a shift in emphasis from one inquiry to another. 48
3. Post-Liparota
In cases following Liparota that involved the term "knowingly
violates," the Court did not apply the Liparota definition of
"knowingly," which required knowledge of the statute. Rather, in
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon,
the Court returned to using the definition of "knowingly" that re-
quired only knowledge of the underlying action.49 The petitioners in
Sweet Home brought a declaratory relief action against the Secretary
of the Interior to challenge the statutory validity of the Secretary's
43. See id. at 425-26.
44. Interestingly, the Court asserted in a footnote that this decision did not create a
mistake of law defense. See id. at 425 n.9. However, the only way to read a holding that people
cannot be convicted unless the government makes a showing "that the defendant knew his
conduct to be unauthorized by statute or regulations," id., is that not knowing the law or that
particular actions are against the law is a valid defense.
45. See supra notes 19-40 and accompanying text.
46. See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425 (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422, 438 (1978), for the proposition that knowledge of the regulation is necessary).
47. See id. at 425-30.
48. The reasons and analysis of this change will be discussed in Parts III and IV.
Justice White in his dissent in Liparota highlighted the Court's inconsistency when he noted
that the Court in Yermian found that:
[U]nder the "most natural reading" of the statute, "knowingly and willfully" applied only
to the making of false or fraudulent statements and not to the fact of jurisdiction. By
the same token, the "most natural reading" of § 2024(b)(1) [wa]s that "knowingly" modi-
fie[d] only the verbs to which it [wa]s attached.
Id. at 435 (citations omitted). Justice White argued that there was no reason to read this
statute differently than the Court read the statute in Yermian because this language was
almost identical to that statute's language. See id. at 435 n.1. Because the Court found the
language in Yermian to be unambiguous, it also should have considered the language in this
statute unambiguous. See id.
49. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 696-
97 (1995) (stating that a knowing action is sufficient to violate the Endangered Species Act).
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regulation defining "harm" in the Endangered Species Act ("ESA7).50
Although the focus of the Court's opinion was not whether knowingly
violating the ESA required knowledge of the regulation, the statute
did require a knowing violation.51 Both Justice Stevens' majority
opinion and Justice Scalia's dissent discussed how one can knowingly
violate the prohibition against harming endangered species, even
though it was not the issue presented in the case.52 These discussions
focused on the actions of the accused vis-A-vis the endangered species
and ignored any need for knowledge of the ESA or its implementing
regulations. 53 Justice Scalia, in his dissent, even noted that a "re-
quirement that a violation be 'knowing' means that the defendant
must 'know the facts that make his conduct illegal ......"5 Thus,
even after the Court diverged from its previous definition of
"knowingly" in Liparota, it did not continue to apply this new
interpretation. Instead, it fluctuated between definitions, using the
definition that best suited its purpose in a specific case.
The Court's next significant case involving an explicit mens rea
issue in a federal criminal statute was United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc.55 In this case, the defendant was convicted of violating the
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977-1 by
transporting child pornography in interstate commerce.57 According
to the defendant, the Act was unconstitutionally vague and violated
50. See id. at 692.
51. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(aXl), (bX) (1994) (one must "knowingly violate the Act or its
implementing regulations"); see also Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 696 n.9.
52. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 696-97, 721-22.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 722 (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1993)).
55. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994). The Act punishes:
(a) Any person who-
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign
commerce by any means including by computer or mails, any
visual depiction, if-
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
(2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction that has been
mailed, or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce, or which contains materials which have been mailed
or so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, or
knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for distribution in interstate
or foreign commerce or through the mails, if-
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct.
57. See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 66-67.
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the First Amendment because it did not require knowledge of the
actor's age for conviction.58 The transportation of pornography involv-
ing adult actors is protected by the First Amendment as long as it is
not obscene.59 In contrast, the transportation of child pornography is
criminal. Thus, the Court held that a statute criminalizing
transportation of pornography had to require knowledge of the actor's
age to be constitutional.60
In interpreting this statute, the Court recognized that the most
natural reading would apply "knowingly" only to the verbs immedi-
ately following the term.61 The Court, however, rejected this inter-
pretation of the statute and adopted a reading that extended
"knowingly" to modify the subsections discussing the actor's age.62 At
this point the Court's reading departed from Yermian, in which the
Court stated that it should adopt the most natural reading of a
statute. Even if the most natural reading resulted in a flawed
statute, the Court should have adopted this type of reading in order to
remain consistent with its past rulings. 63 In X-Citement Video,
however, the Court held that it was its job, not Congress's, to repair
constitutionally-flawed statutes.6 Thus, in X-Citement Video the
Court followed the Liparota-led divergent line of cases that held
"knowingly" should be interpreted to require more than the natural
58. See id. at 67. For further discussion of why knowledge of the actor's age or obscene
material was required by the First Amendment for conviction, see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 765 (1982) (stating that "fals with obscenity laws, criminal responsibility may not be
imposed without some element of scienter on the part of the defendant"); Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 119-24 (1974) (same); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959) (same);
Doth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) (holding that obscenity falls outside the First
Amendment's protection because it is "utterly without redeeming social importance").
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1994); Hamling, 418 U.S. at 99 (upholding constitutionality of
statute prohibiting transportation of obscene material through the mail).
60. See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 78.
61. See id. at 68.
62. See id. at 68-69.
63. See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text.
64. Although the Court does not say this outright, in rejecting the natural reading of the
statute and holding that it was reading the statute as it did to avoid "substantial constitutional
questions," the Court attributed to itself the task of repairing Congress's constitutionally-flawed
statutes. See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 69. There is, of course, at least one countervailing
canon of statutory construction that requires a judge to interpret all statutes so as to avoid
constitutional issues. However, as Karl Llewellyn pointed out in his "dueling canons" article,
for almost every canon of statutory construction, there is an opposing canon. See generally Karl
N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How
Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). To determine which canon to use,
judges must balance the equities involved. In a criminal case, that means balancing the value
of salvaging poorly drafted laws against keeping a person prosecuted under an ambiguous
statute from being convicted. It seems clear that the balance tilts in favor of not convicting
people under laws too ambiguous to provide fair warning of their prohibited acts.
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reading of the statute suggested. 65 Through Liparota and its progeny,
the Court has left lower courts, defendants, and legislators with
sufficient precedent to justify any interpretation of the word
"knowingly" in a federal criminal statute. Further, the Court
developed sufficient precedent to justify inferring a "knowingly"
requirement into a statute and interpreting the implied requirement
in any manner.
C. "Knowingly" as an Implied Mens Rea Standard
1. Pre-Staples v. United States
In United States v. United States Gypsum Co., the Court had to
interpret and determine the requisite level of mens rea for the
Sherman Act because the statute lacked a mens rea element.
6
United States Gypsum and five other manufacturers of gypsum board
were convicted of engaging in a combination and conspiracy in re-
straint of trade. 67 Because the Sherman Act did not specify whether
mens rea was required, the Court considered the penalties associated
with the Sherman Act, the history of mens rea elements in criminal
law generally, and recommendations of the Attorney General to
determine whether the Court should imply a mens rea element into
the statute. 6 The Court concluded that in order to convict under this
statute, the government must prove that a defendant knowingly vio-
lated the Act.6 9 Once the Court stated that a defendant had to act
knowingly, it determined that acting with knowledge meant
knowledge of the "likely effects" of one's actions.70 The Court did not
require that the government prove the defendants had knowledge of
the Sherman Act to convict. 71 United States Gypsum is significant
because it shows that the Court used the same analysis for explicit
65. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
66. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 426 (1978). The Sherman
Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
67. See United States Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 427-33.
68. See id. at 44043.
69. See id. at 444 (concluding that "action undertaken with knowledge of its probable
consequences and having the requisite anticompetitive effects can be a sufficient predicate for a
finding of criminal liability under the antitrust laws").
70. See id. at 446. The Court determined that requiring knowledge of anything more than
the likely effects would be unduly burdensome and unnecessary because section 1 of the
Sherman Act punished planned and calculated conduct. Further, knowledge of the anticipated
consequences could be determined simply by looking at the nature of the conduct itself. See id.
71. See id.
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and implied "knowingly" terms 72 whether the case involved a public
welfare offense or violent crime. 73 Further, the case reflects previous
consistency in the Court's definition of "knowingly."
United States v. Bailey 4 illustrates how the Court adhered to
this definition of "knowingly" even in a case involving a violent crime.
Although the cases that preceded Bailey-Boyce Motor Lines,
International Minerals, and United States Gypsum-all involved
white-collar crimes, Bailey involved a jail break. 5 Bailey and three
other prisoners were convicted of escaping from a District of Columbia
jail.76 The escapees claimed they fled because of inhumane conditions
at the jail, and they remained at large because they feared for their
lives if they surrendered to the FBI.7 Because of the violent nature of
the crime in Bailey, the Court could have decided that the definition
of "knowingly" it adopted in previous cases was inapplicable to the
statute at issue in this case. The Court, however, adopted the same
definition in Bailey as it had used in the previous white-collar crimi-
nal cases.
The Court, recognizing that the statute did not contain a mens
rea element, determined that "knowingly" was the required level of
mens rea because the Court usually considered "knowingly" a
72. Compare id. at 444 (requiring knowledge of anti-competitive actions and their likely
effects only), with Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952) (requiring
actual knowledge of safer routes, but not of the transportation regulations), and United States
v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971) (requiring actual knowledge
of the substance being shipped, but not of the labeling regulations).
73. United States Gypsum committed antitrust violations, while the defendants in Boyce
Motor Lines and International Minerals committed public welfare-type offenses. It was easier
for the Court to adopt a definition of "knowingly" that required only knowledge of the facts in
Boyce Motor Lines and International Minerals because both cases involved inherently dangerous
activities, which if engaged in would endanger the public's health and safety. To protect the
public, the Court was willing to place the burden of knowing the law on the defendants. United
States Gypsum, however, involved conspiracy in restraint of trade, which is not an inherently
dangerous activity likely to harm the public's health or safety. Therefore, the public policy
reasons present in Boyce Motor Lines and International Minerals for adopting a definition of
knowledge that required only knowledge of the facts were not present in United States Gypsum.
That the Court adopted the same definition of "knowingly" in United States Gypsum as it
adopted in the previous two cases suggests that the Court intended this definition to apply in all
cases, not just in the context of public welfare offenses.
74. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
75. See id. at 396. The relevant statute is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (1994):
Whoever escapes or attempts to escape from the custody of the Attorney General... or
from any institution or facility in which he is confined by direction of the Attorney
General, or from any custody under or by virtue of any process issued under the laws of
the United States by any court... shall ... be fined [not more than $5,000] or
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both ....
76. See Bailey, 444 U.S. at 396.




sufficient level of culpability for criminal offenses.78 Then, in defining
this standard, the Court decided that it would adopt the definition set
forth in United States Gypsum: that a person acted "knowingly" "if he
[wals aware 'that the result [wa]s practically certain to follow from
his conduct, whatever his desire may [have been] as to that result.' "79
The Court held that, in order to be convicted for violating the escape
statute, a defendant must have known the facts associated with his
actions and the likely effects that made those actions criminal.8O
Bailey shows that by 1980 the Court had consistently held in both
white-collar and common law-derived crimes that "knowingly"
required only knowledge of the actions and the likely effects that
made the conduct criminal. Until this point, the Court had not
required knowledge of the statute or regulation under which the
defendant was convicted.
2. Staples v. United States: The Implied Mens Rea
Counterpart to Liparota
After Liparota, the Court defined "knowingly" in an ad hoc
fashion in implied mens rea cases, just as it had defined 'knowingly"
in an inconsistent manner when interpreting explicit mens rea
requirements. In Staples v. United States,81 for instance, the Court
read a knowledge requirement into the National Firearms Act
("NFA7).2 The defendant had been convicted of owning an
unregistered "firearm," as defined by the NFA.83 In deciding to imply
a "knowingly" mens rea requirement into the NFA, the Court
considered whether a violation of this Act constituted a public welfare
offense.8 Because gun ownership is permitted by the Constitution8
78. See id. at 408 (stating that "[aiccordingly, we hold that the prosecution fulfills its
burden under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) if it demonstrates that an escapee knew his actions would
result in his leaving physical confinement without permission).
79. Id. at 404 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445
(1978)).
80. See id. at 408.
81. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
82. The NFA imposes strict registration requirements on specific types of firearms and
sets punishment for failure to comply at a maximum of ten years in prison. See 26 U.S.C. §§
5801-5872 (1994). Machine guns and any fully automatic weapons are included in the definition
of a firearm. See id. § 5845(aX6). Further, machine guns are defined as "any weapon which
shoots ... or can be readily restored to shoot automatically more than one shot... by a single
function of the trigger." Id. § 5845(b).
83. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 602.
84. See id. at 606-07. For a definition of public welfare offenses, see United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) ("[A public welfare offense] dispenses with the
conventional requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest
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and is common, the Court did not think the NFA fell into the category
of statutes prohibiting public welfare offenses.6 Therefore, the Court
determined that strict liability was inappropriate and implied a mens
rea requirement into the statute.8 7 The Court then had to define the
applicable mens rea standard. The Court could have defined
"knowingly" to require either that the defendant knew he owned an
unregistered gun, or knew that a registration statute existed and that
his firearm was unregistered.88 The Court chose the latter definition,
believing that knowledge of the statute and of the underlying facts
about registration were so closely tied that to prove one required
proving the other.89
Previous cases presented to the Court, such as International
Minerals, also involved violations of statutes that were closely tied to
whether the defendant knew the statute existed.9 0 In those cases,
however, the Court did not require that the defendant know the law.91
For instance, a defendant who did not know he was required to label
barrels of sulfuric acid before transporting them in interstate
commerce would not label the barrels. When convicted for violating
the federal labeling statute, however, the defendant would be
prohibited from raising an ignorance of the law defense-that he did
not know he was required to label the barrels. Thus, the same close
tie that the court in Staples found-between knowing one needed to
register a firearm and registering it-existed in International
Minerals-between knowing one needed to label a barrel and labeling
it. Because the court in Staples acknowledged this "close tie" between
knowledge of the law and knowledge of one's actions, rather than
dismissing it as it had in prior cases, Staples, like Liparota, repre-
of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but
standing in responsible relation to a public danger."), United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609-
10 (1971) (defining public welfare offense), and United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 253-54(1922) (same). See generally Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV.
55 (1933) (coining the phrase and providing a history and explanation of public welfare
offenses).
85. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. H.
86. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 612 n.6.
87. See id. at 619.
88. The Court could also have avoided implying a mens rea into the NFA and used the
default mens rea, "recklessly." See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1980). However, the Court
chose to imply "knowingly," and these are the two definitions of "knowingly" the Court generally
applied. See supra notes 26-65 and accompanying text.
89. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 622 n.3.
90. See United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 559 (1971)(upholding conviction of a defendant for failing to label toxic chemicals transported in interstate
commerce).
91. See id. at 563-64.
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sented a departure from the Court's established interpretation of the
phrase "knowingly violates." In these two cases, the Court expanded
the definition to require knowledge of the law as well as of the defen-
dant's underlying criminal actions.92
3. Post-Staples
In contrast to Staples, in which the Court implied the term
"knowingly" and then defined "knowingly" to include knowledge of the
statute violated, the Court in Posters 2' Things, Ltd. v. United States
implied the term "knowingly," but did not require knowledge of the
statute.93 The defendant company in Posters 2T Things was convicted
of violating the Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act 94 and
defended itself by claiming it lacked knowledge that the products sold
were primarily intended for use as drug paraphernalia. 95 The act
under which defendant was convicted did not contain an explicit mens
rea requirement.9 As in Staples, the Court decided to imply the term
"knowingly" into the statute based on the premise that mens rea re-
quirements were generally favored in statutes.97 Therefore, the Court
read the statute to require proof that the defendant knowingly sold
drug paraphernalia. 98 But unlike Staples, here the Court determined
that "knowingly" required only that "the defendant be aware that
customers in general are likely to use the merchandise with drugs."99
The Court returned to the definition of "knowingly" that it enunciated
in the Boyce Motor Lines line of cases: knowledge of the defendant's
underlying actions and their likely consequences. 1°°
92. See, e.g., Staples, 511 U.S. at 622 n.3 (stating that "[k]nowledge of whether the gun
was registered is so closely related to knowledge of the registration requirement that requiring
the Government to prove the former would in effect require it to prove knowledge of the law")
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
93. Posters N Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 524 (1994) (holding that while
"the Government must establish that the defendant knew that the items at issue are likely to be
used with illegal drugs, it need not prove specific knowledge that the items are 'drug
paraphernalia' within the meaning of the statute").
94. 21 U.S.C. § 863 (1994). Section 863(a) makes it unlawful for any person "(1) to sell or
offer for sale drug paraphernalia; (2) to use the mails or any other facility of interstate com-
merce to transport drug paraphernalia; or (3) to import or export drug paraphernalia." Id.
§ 863(a).
95. See Posters W Things, 511 U.S. at 525-26.
96. See 21 U.S.C. § 863 (1994).
97. See Posters ?J Things, 511 U.S. at 522-23.
98. See id. at 523.




Thus, rather than clarifying what the mens rea standard
"knowingly" meant, the Court continued to muddy the waters. The
Court interpreted an explicit "knowingly" standard in some cases to
require that the defendant have only knowledge of his or her actions.
For other cases with similar facts, the Court additionally required
knowledge of the law. This same inconsistent interpretation
coincided with the Court's analysis of implied "knowingly" standards.
D. The "Willfully" Mens Rea Standard
When the Court reads "knowingly" to include knowledge of the
law, it is not simply interpreting the statute. Rather, it is adopting
an entirely different mens rea standard. "Willfully," not "knowingly,"
requires knowledge of the law. A quick look at two cases in which the
Court interpreted the mens rea standard "willfully" suggests that
when the Court determines "knowingly" to include knowledge of the
law, it is really changing Congress's statutory language-not
interpreting the statute's terms. In Cheek v. United States, the Court
considered the meaning of willfully violating the tax statutes.'0'
Cheek failed to file seven years worth of personal income tax returns
because he believed the tax laws were unconstitutional.10 2  In
determining whether Cheek willfully violated the law, the Court
asserted that the standard the government had to prove was a
"voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty."1°3 In the
Court's view, an honest mistake did not constitute a "willful" act.
Failure to comply with the law because one disagreed with it,
however, did constitute a "willful" act. 04 Because Cheek knew the
law and merely disagreed with it, the Court held that he could not
argue he lacked the requisite mens rea to violate the statute. 5
In Ratzlaf v. United States, the Court also interpreted
"willfully" to require knowledge of the law.106 Ratzlaf was convicted of
violating an anti-structuring law because he purchased a series of
cashier's checks from different banks, each for less than the $10,000
101. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 194 (1991). The statute at issue in Cheek stated
that "[a]ny person required under this title... or by regulations made under authority thereof
to make a return ... who willfully fails to ... make such return" shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1994).
102. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 194-96.
103. Id. at 196.
104. See id. at 206.
105. See id.
106. See Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 138 (1994).
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amount that would trigger reporting.107 Because the Court defined
"willfully" to require knowledge of the law, and the jury was
instructed on a different definition of "willfully," the Court remanded
the case for findings regarding whether Ratzlaf knew of the statute.10 8
Cheek and Ratzlaf demonstrate that the definition of "willfully"
requires a defendant to know both the law and the facts. 10 9 When the
Court interprets "knowingly" to require an understanding of the
statute being violated, it is interpreting the standard as the
equivalent of "willfully." The Court is interpreting the statute's mens
rea standard as "willfully" in contradiction to Congress's use of the
term "knowingly" in the statute. Thus, the problem with the Court's
mens rea analysis may be less its inability to clearly define mens rea
standards such as "knowingly," and more its desire to rewrite statutes
that it believes Congress drafted poorly. Apparently, the Court wants
to redraft these statutes rather than interpret the mens rea standards
Congress chose. Therefore, efforts by both the Court and Congress
are necessary to clarify the specific role mens rea provisions play in
federal criminal cases.
HI. A QUASI-PLAN MEANiNG APPROACH
A. The Case Against Linguists and Mathematicians
Many articles have been written on how to interpret mens rea
provisions in federal criminal statutes. These articles, however, do
not remedy the inconsistent interpretation of mens rea provisions in
107. See id. at 137. The statutory provisions at issue in Ratzlaf were 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313,
5322, and 5324 (1994), which (1) require that financial institutions file reports with the
Secretary of the Treasury every time they conduct a cash transaction that exceeds $10,000; (2)
define structuring as breaking up a single transaction above $10,000 for the purpose of avoiding
triggering the reporting requirement; and (3) establish criminal penalties for people who
"willfully violate" the anti-structuring provision.
108. See id. at 149. Congress subsequently amended the language of 31 U.S.C. § 5324, re-
moving the willfulness standard. Under the current statute, Ratzlafs actions would probably
subject him to criminal liability. See Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 411, 108 Stat. 2160, 2253 (1994).
109. See, e.g., Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 141 (defining "willfully" in the financial structuring stat-
ute as requiring" knowledge of the reporting requirement and [a] specific intent to commit the
crime'" (quoting United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1978))); Cheek v. United
States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (stating that to meet the "willfully" standard, "the Government
[had] to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this
duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty").
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federal criminal statutes."( Instead, they tend to focus on the
judiciary and how the courts can make sense of what Congress has
written. Their suggestions generally involve developing inter-
pretation aides, such as linguistics, to help interpret mens rea
provisions"' or breaking the crime down into its component elements,
classifying the elements, and then assigning each class an appropriate
mens rea, whether the statute provides one or not."2 Rather than
solving interpretation problems, these suggestions create new debates
over how to classify elements3. and what linguistic techniques judges
should use." 4
Even if judges use these proposed techniques, their analyses of
mens rea provisions would not necessarily become more consistent.
The techniques suggested require that judges make subjective choices
about which linguistical rules to follow or how to divide a statute into
conduct, attendant circumstances, and result. These preliminary
judgments will differ for the very reason the use of interpretive aides
110. For example, Daniel A. Farber discusses the problems with "brilliant" methods of
interpretation and the benefits of simplicity in The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV.
917 (1986) and Brilliance Revisited, 72 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1987).
111. See Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561
(1994) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993)) (four linguists review
Solan's book and describe how linguists can assist judges in interpreting statutes); Michael S.
Moore, Plain Meaning and Linguistics-A Case Study, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1253, 1258 (1995)
(suggesting judges deconstruct statutory provisions containing mens rea requirements into if-
then syllogisms to interpret them).
112. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grail, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal
Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 703-04 (1983) (advocating
the use of the Model Penal Code's element-by-element analysis for determining the mens rea
required for criminal offenses).
113. Element-by-element analysis suggests interpreting statutes by dividing their provi-
sions into conduct, attendant circumstances, and result and assigning a mental state (either
"purposely," "knowingly," "recklessly," or "negligently") to each division. For instance, a person
acts "purposely" with respect to his circumstances if "he is aware of the existence of such cir-
cumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist." Id. at 696-98 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(a)(ii) (1980)). The problems associated with this method stem from the same reason
scholars advocate for its use in the first place: the statute is unclear. For instance, theft by
deception is defined by the Model Penal Code to require that the offender purposely obtain
property through deceit. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3 (1980). To deceive, the offender must
purposely "create[ ] or reinforce[ ] a false impression ... as to law, value, intention or other
state of mind .... " Id. § 223.3(1). The conduct for this crime could simply be to create, or to
create or reinforce a false impression. See Robinson & Grall, supra note 112, at 696-98.
Because the statute is unclear, breaking the statute into elements is difficult. Individual judges
will likely divide the statutory elements differently, thus negating the point of using this
method. Rather than providing a consistent analysis of mens rea provisions in federal criminal
statutes, the element-by-element method proves to be just as subjective and inconsistent as the
Court's current ad hoc approach.
114. Compare Cunningham et al., supra note 111, at 1561 (suggesting that judges use
linguists generally to discover the meanings of statutes), with Moore, supra note 111, at 1253




was suggested: the statutes being considered are ambiguous or
vague. Therefore, inconsistent analyses will continue.
Further, even if these suggestions did offer some guidance to
judges, they offer little or no assistance the general public trying to
understand the statutes. Few, if any, lay people have access to
linguists who can interpret statutes for them. Nor should the average
citizen require the assistance of a linguist, mathematician, or legal
scholar to understand criminal statutes. Lay people who live under
these statutes daily and who are subject to their penalties need to be
able to understand them. If a judge needs a linguist to understand
one of Congress's statutes, the problem is not with the judge's
interpretive abilities, but with the statute itself. Thus, theories that
focus on judges' interpretations are incomplete because they attempt
to clarify statutes for only a portion of the audience that must be able
to read and understand them. Further, these theories' confuse the
judges they are intended to aid and do nothing to help other
individuals who need to understand the statutes.
The theory proposed in this Note focuses as much on
Congress's drafting abilities as on judges' interpretative abilities in an
attempt to develop consistent readings of mens rea provisions in
federal criminal statutes. By focusing on Congress and its drafting of
statutes, this Note seeks to clarify the language used in statutes, so
that both judges and lay people can be aware of what activity a stat-
ute prohibits and what mens rea a statute requires.
B. Two Fundamentals of Criminal Law: Lenity and Notice
Many criminal laws and procedures (for instance, requiring the
government to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, granting a
defendant the right against self-incrimination, and requiring federal
juries to return unanimous verdicts to convict) stem from an
institutional belief that in order to adequately protect individual
liberties against a potentially tyrannical government, the law should
provide criminal defendants some safeguards.115 The rules of lenity
and notice are two such protections.
115. The idea that laws should give individuals certain rights that place them on more
equal footing with the government derives from one of the basic ideas behind the republican
form of government: that to protect individual liberty, the federal government's power must be
checked. The way to protect individual liberty and prevent too much power from aggregating in
one place was to allow "the private interest of every individual [to] be a sentinel over the public
rights." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). By
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The rule of lenity, one of the basic canons of statutory con-
struction, establishes that if a statute is ambiguous, it should be
interpreted so as to favor the defendant.116 Underlying this canon is
the notion that a person should not be held responsible for violating a
law that could be interpreted in a number of ways, one of which
makes the defendant's conduct innocent." 7 This theory is important
because with criminal law the defendant could serve jail time for her
mistaken interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Although judges do
interpret ambiguous statutes in favor of criidnal defendants, they
seem to be equally willing to go to great lengths to find that a statute
is unambiguous.118 Judges have frequently held that the rule of lenity
does not apply if a statute can be interpreted in any way that makes
it unambiguous."1 Such an approach is at odds with the founding
placing individuals in a position equal to the government and thus enabling them to challenge
or check the government, society ensures that the rights of all individuals are protected. See id.
In the criminal law context, checking government power by protecting individual rights is
reflected in the law's underlying premises of due process, notice, and lenity. One of the most
forceful explanations of this premise came from Justice Black in Chambers v. Florida:
From the popular hatred and abhorrence of illegal confinement, torture and extortion of
confessions of violations of the "law of the land" evolved the fundamental idea that no
man's life, liberty or property be forfeited as criminal punishment for violation of that
law until there had been a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal free of
prejudice, passion, excitement, and tyrannical power. Thus, as assurance against an-
cient evils, our country, in order to preserve "the blessings of liberty," wrote into its ba-
sic law the requirement, among others, that the forfeiture of the lives, liberties or prop-
erty of people accused of crime can only follow if procedural safeguards of due process
have been obeyed.
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1940); see also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307, 321 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (affirming this statement with regard to the necessity
of probable cause); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 194 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting)
(explaining that unlawful search and seizure should immunize a defendant from prosecution
based on reasons derived from Justice Black).
116. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,437 (1978); United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971);
Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344
U.S. 218,221-22 (1952).
117. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 (stating that application of the rule of lenity ensures that
criminal statutes will provide fair warning concerning conduct rendered illegal and strikes the
appropriate balance between the legislature, the prosecutor, and the court in defining criminal
liability); see also United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 600 (1995) (noting that before convict-
ing a person of a crime, "'a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the
common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed'"
(quoting McBoyle v. United States, 238 U.S. 25, 27 (1931))).
118. See, e.g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 107-08 (1990) (noting that statutory
ambiguity is the "touchstone" of the rule of lenity) (citations omitted); United States v. Yermian,
468 U.S. 63, 70 n.7 (1984) ("Because the statutory language unambiguously dispenses with an
actual knowledge requirement, we have no occasion to apply the principle of lenity urged by the
dissent.").
119. See, e.g., Moskal, 498 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If the rule of lenity means
anything, it means that the Court ought not do what it does today: use an ill-defined general
purpose to override an unquestionably clear term of art. .. ").
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principles of criminal law: that only those who acted with evil intent
should be convicted.120
In addition to the rule of lenity, the requirement of notice or
fair warning is foundational to criminal law.121 The notion is that
people should be convicted only for violating laws that clearly set
forth what conduct is prohibited. Fundamental fairness underlies our
criminal law in the guise of due process, and due process requires that
people not be convicted under vague or ambiguous laws. 122 Therefore,
Congress should draft laws to provide people with fair warning of
what conduct is prohibited.123 The Court should interpret those stat-
utes in favor of the people trying to understand them, not in favor of
the legislature that drafted them.
The Court should interpret a statute in favor of defendants if
its plain meaning could be one of several meanings and Congress is
not explicit about which interpretation is correct.'2 If the plain
120. See generally Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974 (1936) (discussing
historical mental requirements for criminality and the transition from these requirements to a
general mens rea framework).
121. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 (considering fair notice and the rule of lenity "two policies
that have long been part of our [statutory interpretation] tradition").
122. Support for this notion comes directly from the Sixth Amendment, which states, "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall... be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Further, Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson
explained the importance of notice to due process when they stated in dissent that:
If a statute does not satisfy the due-process requirement of giving decent advance notice
of what it is which, if happening, will be visited with punishment, so that men may pre-
sumably have an opportunity to avoid the happening, then... bringing to pass such an
undefined and too uncertain event cannot make it sufficiently definite and ascertain-
able.
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 154 (1945) (internal citations omitted); see also Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957). Explanation of the various roles notice plays throughout
the legal system may be found in Oliver Wendell Holmes' The Common Law. For instance, in
addition to its fundamental fairness role, notice plays a role in legitimizing laws. As Holmes
explained, law must, at base, reflect the morality of the community. A "law which punished
conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average member of the community would be too
severe for that community to bear." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 50 (1923).
Thus, a community must have notice of laws in order to determine whether they are laws the
community can bear, i.e., legitimate laws the community will follow.
123. See Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229-30.
124. If Congress explicitly describes how a statute should be read, the statute should be
read according to Congress's instructions, even if there are other possible interpretations of the
statute. Such a statute is not ambiguous since Congress has clarified any ambiguity by explain-
ing how the statute is to be interpreted. Cf Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme
Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REv. 107, 124 (discussing the relationship between mens rea doctrine and
the vagueness doctrine and concluding that if Congress expressed the scope of its statutes with
sufficient clarity, there would be "no mens rea analogue to the vagueness doctrine"). Congress
should describe how it intends a statute to be read in the statute's preamble or purpose section.
Although legislative history may provide another vehicle for expressing congressional intent,
the legislative history is not part of the statute. The purpose behind developing a plain meaning
approach to federal criminal statutes is to enable people to know what conduct is prohibited
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meaning is clear, a judge should apply the statute accordingly. If the
plain meaning of the statute is ambiguous, a judge should apply the
meaning most favorable to defendants. The rule of lenity should be
applied in this way even if the natural way to read the statute makes
the statute unconstitutional. In this situation, the fact that a statute
straddles the constitutional line provides additional support for
reading the statute in the most natural way and finding the statute
unconstitutional. If the Court strains to interpret an ambiguous stat-
ute in a way that makes it constitutional, the person convicted under
the statute may have her constitutional rights infringed. To avoid
such infringements, the rules of lenity and notice require that judges
adhere to the principles underlying criminal law125 and choose the
reading of a statute that is most favorable to the defendant, even if
that means invalidating a statute.126
A presumption that people know the law complements the
roles of the rules of lenity and notice in this proposal for a more con-
sistent method of interpreting mens rea in federal criminal statutes.
If Congress has drafted a criminal law clearly, then the principle that
ignorance of the law is not a defense and the rule of lenity have no
role to play. Although this result may seem contradictory, further
inquiry reveals that the same reasoning underlies using the rule of
lenity when the plain meaning of a statute is ambiguous and
prohibiting people from claiming ignorance of an explicit law. One
reason for employing the rule of lenity is that the legal system
assumes people conform their behavior to statutes. 27 If a statute can
be read in several ways, an individual is likely to follow the reading
most favorable to herself. Since her reading is valid, and Congress
failed in its job of making the statute clear and unambiguous, the
Court should uphold the individual's reading of the statute. The basis
of this reasoning is that the defendant knew the law, conformed her
behavior to the law, and should not be punished because Congress
drafted an ambiguous statute.
The same reasoning underscores the theory that ignorance of
the law is not a defense: people rely on the law and act in accordance
with statutes. No legal system, especially not a criminal justice sys-
tem, could function legitimately if judges presumed people did not
from the plain meaning of the statute's words. Therefore, Congress should express its intent in
the statute itself, not the legislative history.
125. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
127. See HOLMES, supra note 122, at 50.
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know the law.128 Chaos would result because people would have no
incentive to learn the law. Therefore, requiring lenity when a statute
is ambiguous and requiring that defendants know the law is consis-
tent. Because our law presumes the latter, it must allow the former
when a statute can be understood in more than one way.129
C. A Quasi-Plain Meaning Approach?
1. How the Approach Operates
The next question then is why rely only on the plain meaning
of a statute? If the criminal law is so concerned with protecting the
criminal defendants' rights against a powerful government, why not
read all statutes to favor the defendant rather than only doing so if
the plain meaning of the statute is ambiguous? The answer is that
under the Constitution, Congress has the power to make laws'30 and
the judiciary applies the laws."'1 Thus, judges should apply the law
that Congress makes, not make laws of their own."32 Some may argue
that when a judge applies the law to a particular set of facts, the
judge is essentially making law because she is setting precedent. In
the future, judges will generally interpret that statute in the same
manner as the first judge. Judges setting precedent by following the
plain meaning of a statute, however, are not making law by creating a
new statute. Rather, they are interpreting the law by providing
examples for people to follow. When judges go beyond just providing
examples to accompany Congress's words and meaning, they exceed
the limits of their constitutional powers."'3
128. Cf. ROLuN M. PERKINS, CRmmnAL LAw 807 (1957) (explaining that the maxim
"ignorance of the law is no excuse" is deeply imbedded in our criminal justice system).
129. But see Packer, supra note 124, at 145 (stating that the concept of ignorantia legis is
inconsistent with mes rea). As explained above, the two concepts of lenity and ignorance of the
law is not a defense are not necessarily inconsistent.
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States....-).
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.").
132. For a general explanation of why the roles of Congress and the Court dictate using a
plain meaning approach, see William Eskridge's article critiquing Justice Scalia's "new textual-
ism." William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. RFV. 621, 653-56 (1990).
133. Support for this approach to statutory interpretation can be found in the scholarship
of legal positivism. Positivists place a premium on the value of clearly distinguishing lawmak-
ing from law-applying. See, e.g., H.LA. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,
71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 612 (1958). They do this in part, because, in a pluralist society, "ordinary
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For example, consider a variation of Hart and Sacks's hypo-
thetical statute prohibiting vehicles in the park.TM  Congress passes a
law that provides criminal penalties for walking a dog without a leash
on federal property.13 5 This statute does not include a mens rea ele-
ment. If a judge convicts a man who was walking his German shep-
herd in a federal park without a leash, the judge has not determined
that only men walking German shepherds will be convicted under the
statute. Rather, the judge has provided an example of the kinds of
actions prohibited. If the judge had decided that the man could not be
convicted because this statute required the mens rea standard
"knowingly" and the man did not know he was walking his dog in a
federal park, the judge would be creating a new statute, rather than
interpreting Congress's statute.
This is not to say the judge was incorrect in determining that
the statute needed a mens rea element. As noted earlier, one of the
basic premises of criminal law is that only those who act with an "evil
intent" should be convicted. 36 Therefore, it may have been proper for
the judge to determine that she could not convict the defendant be-
cause the statute did not include a mens rea element and one was
necessary. The judge should not have read a mens rea requirement
into the statute, however, because in doing so the judge created a law
different from the one drafted by Congress. Instead, if the judge de-
termined that a mens rea element was necessary for this statute to
meet the constitutional requirements of due process, the judge should
have held that the statute was unconstitutional. 37 If Congress
wanted to have a law that criminalized walking dogs without leashes
citizens should be in a position to identify what the law is and to act on that law" without
reference to controversial moral propositions. Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal
Positivism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 241 (Dennis M.
Patterson ed., 1996). The legal positivist's emphasis on the importance of a recognizable set of
laws to which people can conform their behavior provides a strong argument for interpreting
federal criminal statutes according to their plain meaning. Any other method for interpreting
these statutes reduces the likelihood that the average citizen will be able to understand the law
and conform her actions to it because other methods require the judiciary to apply more
controversial techniques of statutory interpretation. See generally Frederick F. Schauer, Rules
and the Rule-FollowingArgument, in LAW AND LANGUAGE 313 (Frederick F. Schauer ed., 1993).
134. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1111 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994) (discussing the role of courts in interpreting statutes throughout the
chapter).
135. We are assuming for argument's sake that Congress could pass such a statute.
136. See generally Sayre, supra note 120, at 982-94 (explaining the historical development
of mens rea law including the importance of evil intent as an element of every crime).
137. Again, we are assuming that such a crime could be unconstitutional for lacking mens
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in federal parks, then it would have to redraft the law to add the
requisite mens rea element.
The above example demonstrates that if judges follow the
Constitution and interpret Congress's criminal statutes according to
their plain meaning, judges can assist Congress in its law-making
efforts. Judges should not only apply the law, but rather should
participate in a law-making conversation. 18 This conversation can
only work if everyone understands the words being used. Congress
must draft statutes that can be understood according to the plain
meaning of their words, and the judiciary must interpret the statutes
according to the plain meaning of the words used.
To illustrate, consider Alice's conversation with Humpty
Dumpty quoted to at the outset of this Note.139  In Alice in
138. "All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the full-
est and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until
their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudica-
tions." THE FEDERALI No. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). But, for
these adjudications to occur, the adjudicators must have some idea of what the law they are
interpreting means. In other words, Congress must draft criminal statutes that clearly prohibit
specific conduct.
139. In her wanderings, Alice comes upon Humpty Dumpty sitting on his wall and they
engaged in a conversation about whether it is better to get birthday presents or presents when
it is not your birthday ("un-birthday presents"). The conversation flowed as follows:
ITlhere are three hundred and sixty-four days when you might get un-birthday pre-
sents--"
"Certainly," said Alice.
"And only one for birthday presents, you know. There's glory for you!"
"I don't know what you mean by 'glory,'" Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't-till I tell you. I
meant' [sic] there's a nice knock-down argument for you!"
"But, 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument,' "Alice objected.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means
just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean different things."
'The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all."
Alice was too much puzzled to say anything, so after a minute Humpty Dumpty
began again.
"They've a temper, some of them-particularly verbs, they're the proud-
est-adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs-however, I can manage the
whole lot! Impenetrability! That's what I say!"
"Would you tell me, please," said Alice, what that means?"
"Now you talk like a reasonable child," said Humpty Dumpty, looking very much
pleased. "I meant by 'impenetrability' that we've had enough of that subject, and it
would be just as well if you'd mention what you mean to do next, as I suppose you don't
intend to stop here all the rest of your life."
That's a great deal to make one word mean," Alice said in a thoughtful tone.
"When I make a word do a lot of work like that," said Humpty Dumpty, "I always
pay it extra."
"Oh!" said Alice. She was too much puzzled to make any other remark.
CARROLL, supra note 1, at 159.
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Wonderland, Alice could not engage in a conversation with Humpty
Dumpty because she understood the ordinary definition of the words
Humpty Dumpty used, not Humpty Dumpty's definitions. Humpty
Dumpty, however, believed he could give words any meaning he
wanted, use them in sentences, and people would understand him.
This behavior confused Alice because she expected Humpty Dumpty
to use the words as they were ordinarily used. Because Humpty
Dumpty never sufficiently explained how he was defining words, Alice
was never able to engage in a meaningful conversation with him.
Instead, she was left "too much puzzled to make any other remark."140
Like Humpty Dumpty and Alice, Congress and the Court also
have difficulty communicating when Congress does not use plain
meanings in ordinary language. The Court can understand the plain
meaning of the words Congress uses to draft statutes. But if
Congress intends a statute to mean something other than what the
plain meaning of the words suggest, it has to explain that to the
Court. The judiciary's role then is to interpret the plain meaning of
this statute; tell Congress whether the statute is constitutional; and if
unconstitutional, suggest repairs that would make the statute
constitutional. The Court should not, however, rewrite a statute for
Congress. Congress can then either change the statute's wording or if
Congress believes the wording conveys its intent, it can add language
explaining how the statute should be interpreted. Congress might
choose the latter if Congress and the Court disagreed about the plain
meaning of the statute's words.
At some point this new statute will be challenged and the judi-
ciary will again interpret what Congress wrote. If Congress ade-
quately redrafted the statute, then the judiciary should have no prob-
lem applying the statute in the way Congress wanted. If, however,
Congress still does not agree with the judiciary's application, it can
rewrite the statute again. This dialogue will ensure that Congress
drafts statutes that are clear enough to give people fair warning of
what they prohibit, and that neither the legislative nor the judicial
branch exceeds its constitutional powers.
2. Why a Quasi-Plain Meaning Approach is Necessary
When the Court makes new laws by interpreting the language
of a statute to go beyond the words' plain meanings, the Court vio-




supposed to interpret the law and not make it is that in order to
protect individuals' rights, the three branches of the federal govern-
ment have to each retain limited powers.' 4 ' If the judiciary is permit-
ted to interpret Congress's criminal statutes based on factors other
than the words of the statute and any explicit explanations Congress
provided regarding the statute's purpose, then the judiciary is
enlarging its powers. When the Court goes beyond a statute's plain
meaning, it implies that its interpretation is the statute that
Congress should have passed, instead of interpreting what Congress
enacted. Additionally, the judiciary is infringing on the powers of
Congress. This aggrandizement and infringement threatens the secu-
rity of individual liberties by (1) allowing too much power to be held in
too few hands4 2 and (2) allowing Congress to pass laws that do not
provide sufficient notice, but under which people are nevertheless
prosecuted.' 43
The argument exists that Congress is a group, not an individ-
ual, and thus cannot have one intent for enacting a statute.144 Nor is
Congress capable of drafting a statute that will cover every possible
scenario likely to arise under the statute. 45 Further, there are a
multitude of other reasons why scholars might object to the approach
set forth in this Note. 46
141. Liberty will be lost, the Federalists said, if all legislative, executive, and judicial pow-
ers were allowed to accumulate in the same hands. "[Whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective [such an accumulation] may justly be pronounced
the very definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
142. See id.
143. See Robert S. Summers, Judge Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 89 MICH. L. REv.
1302, 1321 (1991) (reviewing RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990))
(explaining that a plain meaning interpretation provides fairer notice).
144. See, e.g., ROGER H. DAvIDSoN & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS
388, 401 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing that intent is difficult to discern because the political record
does not always make clear why particular legislators vote for bills); Melissa P. Collie, Voting
Behavior in Legislatures, in HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH 471-518 (Gerhard
Loewenberg et al. eds., 1985) (explaining that legislators vote for statutes for a variety of
reasons and do not all operate with the same intent); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory
of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 350-52 (1985) (questioning whether a collective intent
may be found in Congress).
145. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 340-45 (1990) (discussing that context, indetermi-
nacy, and various other factors change the plain meaning of a statute and thus the situations to
which it applies).
146. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism,
and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 534-35 (1992) (asserting that reliance on practical
reason is necessary when engaging in statutory interpretation because of the importance of
context and purpose in determining what statutes mean).
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The bottom line, however, is that the constitutional ideals of
due process and fundamental fairness require this plain meaning
approach to interpreting federal criminal statutes. The inconvenience
and impracticability that scholars associate with this approach derive
from the nature of the system of government--one with three
separate and equal branches, each with limited powers-that the
Framers created. Further, under this system it is fimdamentally
unfair to take away people's freedom based on ambiguous and vague
laws. In order for people to have the necessary notice of what actions
are criminal, Congress must draft statutes that the ordinary person
can understand, and the judiciary must interpret Congress's statutes
according to the plain meaning of words.
Drafting clear statutes, of course, is not an easy task. Words
are complex, and expressing one's exact thought or intent can be
difficult. 147  The Constitution, however, delegates this task to
Congress. The more the judiciary interprets Congress's statutes con-
trary to their plain meaning, the less notice will be provided to the
public about what behavior is prohibited. That people could go to jail
without notice violates due process and fundamental fairness.
IV. IS A CONSISTENT ANALYSIS OF MENS REA ISSUES IN FEDERAL
CRITINAL CASES POSSIBLE?
The key question for this proposed quasi-plain meaning ap-
proach is whether it will result in consistent mens rea analysis in
federal criminal cases. On a theoretical level, it should because the
Court will be interpreting mens rea requirements, or the lack thereof,
147. Writers deal with this dilemma daily, but still find a way to convey their meaning
through words. If they could not, we would not have books, or theories of math, science,
philosophy, or law. If words were as indeterminate as anti-plain meaning theorists insist, we
would never be able to communicate with each other because we would never be able to
understand what another person was saying. But we do communicate. Therefore, words must
have ordinary meanings that we can all recognize and that Congress can use as the basis for
drafting statutes that people can understand. As James Madison stated when discussing the
drafting of statutes, "The use of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity, therefore, requires not
only that the ideas should be distinctly formed, but that they should be expressed by words
distinctly and exclusively appropriate to them." THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The assertion that we do communicate has been the
subject of ongoing debate among linguistical philosophers. Although the details of this debate
fall outside the scope of this Note, it is important to recognize that this Note's premise-that
words can and do have plain meanings-is not necessarily a foregone conclusion. See generally
EDMUND HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS: AN NTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY (Dorion
Cairns trans., 1973); LAW AND LANGUAGE (Frederick Schauer ed., 1993); FERDINAND DE
SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL INGLISTICS (Charles Bally & Albert Sechehaye eds., Roy
Harris trans., Duckworth 1983).
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based on the ordinary words of the statute. For example, statutes
with one mens rea requirement, like "knowingly," will be interpreted
the same way because the Court will give one meaning to the word
"knowingly." Thus, if the Court determines that to commit a crime
"knowingly" requires the defendant know what she did and not that
she know the law, the Court will use this definition to interpret every
federal criminal statute with the mens rea requirement "knowingly."
A review of the sample of cases set forth in Part II using the
proposed method will show that mens rea case law can be clarified by
using a plain meaning approach combined with a general rule requir-
ing leniency when there is more than one plain meaning of a statute.
Any other approach allows the Court to alter its definition of a mens
rea requirement in every case, as the particular facts of that case
dictate.148
In Liparota v. United States, the Court interpreted the provi-
sion, "whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or pos-
sesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized
by this chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to this chapter
shall... be guilty of a felony... ."149 The Court determined that
innocent conduct would be overly criminalized unless it read
"knowingly" to apply to "authorized by this chapter."150 Thus, the
Court implied a "knowingly violates" requirement into this statute
and then defined that element to require knowledge not just of what
148. For instance, consider a version of the previous "dog on a leash" statute, again ignor-
ing any constitutional problems with the statute. Assume the statute provides (1) it is unlawful
to walk a dog without a leash on federal property and (2) anyone who knowingly violates this
statute shall be imprisoned for no more than 13 months or fined up to $1,000, or both. Two
different cases come before the Court based on this statute. In one, the facts show that the
defendant frequently walked his dog on federal property without a leash, was asked to put his
dog on a leash by a park policeman at least one time prior to his arrest, but was never told there
was a statute that prohibited walking a dog not on a leash on federal property. In the second
case, the facts show that the defendant frequently walked his dog on federal property without a
leash, was never asked to put the dog on a leash, and did not know the statute existed. In the
first case, the Court might find, considering all the facts, that "knowingly violates" means
simply knowing that your actions are wrongful. The defendant was asked at least once to put
his dog on a leash; thus he was on notice that his actions were wrongful even if he did not know
of the exact statute that prohibited his conduct. While in the second case the Court might find
that "knowingly violates" requires knowing about the law also. Because the defendant's actions
were so close to innocent conduct, the Court might find that the only way to interpret this
statute is that "knowingly violates" requires that the defendant know what he did and know
about the statute.
We might approve of the results the Court reached in both cases because they seem to be
the just results. The Court, however, has put every potential defendant (everyone who walks
their dogs on federal property) in a position of not knowing what it means to "knowingly violate"
the law regarding leashes.
149. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,420 n.1 (1985) (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2024(bXl)).
150. Id. at 427-28.
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the defendant did, but also of the statute. If the Court had applied a
plain meaning approach, it would not have implied a "knowingly vio-
lates" provision into the statute because that would be contrary to the
plain words of the statute.
These words, given their plain meaning, set forth that an indi-
vidual violates the statute if he or she "knowingly uses, transfers,
acquires, alters or possesses coupons, authorization cards, or access
devices."151 The statute does not base a person's guilt on her
knowingly using, transferring, acquiring, altering, or possessing cou-
pons or authorization cards knowing this action to be in a manner not
authorized by this chapter. By reading that language into the statute,
the Court ignored the statute Congress created and developed its own
statute regarding the illegal use of food stamps. As noted earlier, this
is not the Court's role.152
Further, the Court altered its own definition of what it meant
to "knowingly violate" a statute. Until Liparota, that phrase meant
only knowing the underlying actions that made one's conduct crimi-
nal. The Court's decision in Liparota shows how failure to interpret
statutes according to their plain meaning leaves people uncertain
about the definition of "knowingly violates" and whether the behavior
that Congress intended to prohibit is the same behavior the Court will
deem prohibited. .-Iad the Court interpreted this statute according to
the plain meaning of its words, its definition of "knowingly violates"
would have remained consistent with prior interpretations.
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater
OregonI s confirms the theory that if the Court adopted a plain mean-
ing approach to mens rea in Liparota, the law regarding mens rea
would be consistent. In Sweet Home, the Court did what this Note
suggests it should do: it interpreted "knowingly violates" to mean the
defendant had to know he harmed an endangered species, whether or
not he knew that the animal was classified as endangered under the
Endangered Species Act.15M Taking Sweet Home with the above
hypothetical interpretation of Liparota shows that the proposed
method would clarify that "knowingly," when used in a criminal
statute, means knowing that one performed specific wrongful actions,
not knowing the specifics of the statute.
151. Id. at 420 n.1 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)).
152. See supra notes 133-47 and accompanying text.
153. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687
(1995).
154. Id. at 696-97 n.9.
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The same clarifying effect occurs when the proposed method is
applied to cases such as Staples v. United States15s and Posters 7N'
Things, Ltd. v. United States,156 in which the Court implied the
"knowingly" mens rea requirement into the statutes. In both cases,
the Court ignored the plain meaning of the statute because it implied
words, specifically the word "knowingly," into the statutes. 57 These
cases are examples of instances when the two parts of the proposed
method seem to be inconsistent. Although, arguably, the rule of lenity
would require a judge to interpret a "knowingly" requirement into the
statute, the plain meaning interpretation requires interpreting the
statute according to the words Congress used. As discussed
previously, 58 this is not inconsistent when considering the founding
principles of criminal law. The rule of lenity is only applicable when
the plain meaning of the words is ambiguous, and in neither of these
statutes does the plain meaning of the words involve the term
"knowingly."
The Court may decide that without a mens rea requirement of
"knowingly," the statutes violate the Constitution.159 Instead of re-
pairing Congress's statutes so that they satisfy constitutional re-
quirements, the Court should find the statutes unconstitutional and
return them to Congress to add the word "knowingly." In so doing,
the Court would be engaging in a law-making dialogue with Congress
that would force Congress to improve its drafting of statutes and
simultaneously allow lay people to know what the law prohibits. If
the Court does not follow this method and repairs Congress's statutes,
Congress has no incentive to improve its drafting. Further, people
reading statutes will not know if the conduct the statute appears to
prohibit is the same behavior that the Court will determine the
statute bans. People, thus, will not have the notice necessary to make
enforcing criminal laws fundamentally fair.
155. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
156. Posters WN' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513 (1994).
157. The statute in Staples provided strict registration requirements on statutorily-defined
"firearms." Section 5845(aX6) of the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1994),
defined "firearm" to include a machine gun, and section 5845(b) defined "machine gun" as "any
weapon which shoots.., or can be readily restored to shoot automatically more than one
shot. . . by a single function of the trigger." The statute involved in Posters 2T Things provided
that "it is unlawful for any person (1) to make use of the services of the Postal Service or other
interstate conveyance as part of a scheme to sell drug paraphernalia; (2) to offer for sale and
transportation in interstate or foreign commerce drug paraphernalia; or (3) to import or export
drug paraphernalia." 21 U.S.C. § 857, amended by 21 U.S.C. § 863 (1994).
158. See supra notes 115-29 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of assuming
that people know the law with respect to the functioning of the criminal justice system).
159. See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994).
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X-Citement Video presented such a situation in that the Court
interpreted a statute contrary to the statute's plain meaning. 160 In X-
Citement Video, the Court recognized that the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit had adopted "the most natural grammatical read-
ing161 of the statute. "Knowingly" did not apply to the age of the
performers in the pornographic videos. The Court, however, relied on
the canon of construction that statutes should be read to avoid consti-
tutional problems, and applied the "knowingly" requirement to the
age of the performers.162 By interpreting the statute this way, the
Court repeated its actions in Posters 2TJ Things and Staples: It ig-
nored the statute Congress wrote and drafted its own statute regard-
ing child pornography. Although the Court's statute is constitutional
and Congress's was not, the Court overstepped its constitutional
authority by drafting a statute.163
Further, the Court has upset individuals' abilities to rely on
the words of statutes to convey the law.16 Although in X-Citement
Video the Court's alteration of the statute resulted in the same
outcome that would have occurred if the Court had found the statute
unconstitutional, in other cases people could be convicted under the
Court's interpretation while they may not have been convicted under
the plain meaning interpretation. Therefore, the only way to ensure
that the public has sufficient notice, and that Congress and the Court
adhere to the separation of powers doctrine is for the Court to apply a
plain meaning interpretation, combined with a general rule of lenity,
to federal criminal statutes.
A look at the most recent federal criminal mens rea case, Bates
v. United States, 65 suggests that the Court recognizes how confusing
160. See id.
161. Id. at 68. A comment Justice Scalia made in his dissenting opinion illuminates just
how natural the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the statute was: "To say.., that [the Ninth
Circuit's] interpretation is 'the most grammatical reading' is understatement to the point of
distortion-rather like saying that the ordinarily preferred total for two plus two is four." Id. at
81 (internal citations omitted).
162. See id. at 78.
163. See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 115-29 and accompanying text.
165. Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 118 S. Ct. 285 (1997). Since Bates, the Court
granted certiorari and then dismissed it in Rogers v. United States, 522 U.S. 252, 118 S. Ct. 673,
677 (1998). In the dismissal discussion, the Court addressed what a knowing violation of the
National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)(i) (1994), entailed. According to the Rogers Court,
Staples required "the Government to prove that the defendant knew that the item he possessed
had the characteristics that brought it within the statutory definition of a firearm." Id. at 675.
The Court, however, asserted that the defendant need not know his possession is unlawful. See
id. But, in order to know that the item had the statutory characteristics of a firearm, the
defendant may have to know how the NFA defines "firearm." Id. Although the Court seems to
move toward a definition of "knowingly" that requires only knowledge of the facts, the value of
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it has made the law of mens rea. Many commentators hoped the
Court would use Bates to finally explain whether it would imply mens
rea requirements into statutes.166 The Court held that it would not
imply a specific intent requirement into the statute because the plain
meaning of the statute showed that one did not exist.167 In other
words, because Congress did not include a specific mens rea standard
in the statute, the Court was not willing to add it. The Court,
however, refused to address the issue of what "knowingly" meant in
this statute because the government did not challenge the Seventh
Circuit's interpretation of the term.16 8 Thus, Bates does not indicate
how the Court will analyze mens rea standards in future federal
criminal cases.
Bates suggests that the Court is leery of discussing mens rea
issues unless required, presumably because the Court recognizes the
confusing state of the law. So, until the next case reaches the Court
presenting a federal criminal mens rea issue directly, no one can
know if the Court will comply with the plain meaning analysis it
seemed to gravitate toward in Bates. This is the only method of
analysis, however, that will allow the Court to protect both the inter-
ests of criminal defendants and the constitutional structure underly-
ing federal criminal law.
V. CONCLUSION
The problems with the Court's mens rea analysis in federal
criminal cases highlighted here reflect the problems associated with
the Rogers opinion is questionable. The Court's discussion comes in the guise of a dismissal of
certiorari, the question presented is not what a defendant must know to violate the Act, and the
opinion is merely a plurality. Thus, the Court has yet to adopt one definition of "knowingly"
that squares with precedent.
166. See, e.g., Timothy W. Floyd, Proving a Guilty Mind: In a Prosecution for Misapplying
Federally Guaranteed Student-Loan Funds, Must the Prosecution Prove Specific Intent to
Defraud the United States?, PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS., Sept. 18, 1997, at 12, 15 (speculating
as to whether the Court would imply a specific intent requirement into 20 U.S.C. § 1097(a)
(1994)).
167. See Bates, 118 S. Ct. at 290 (stating that "where Congress includes particular lan-
guage in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclu-
sion'" (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))) (other citations omitted).
168. The Seventh Circuit held that knowingly and willfully misapplying funds "require[d]
the government to allege and prove that the defendant consciously, voluntarily, and intention-
ally exercised unauthorized control... over federally provided or guaranteed Title IV
funds ... while knowing that such an exercise of control.. . was a violation of the law." United
States v. Bates, 96 F.3d 964, 970 (7th Cir. 1996).
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mens rea law generally. There is no set method used by the Court to
interpret mens rea requirements, such as "knowingly." Further, there
is no established method for interpreting the mens rea provisions of
any criminal statutes. Rather, the Court takes an ad hoc approach to
mens rea issues, reading mens rea requirements into some statutes
but not other similar statutes, and defining the same mens rea term
differently in various statutes. The reasons that the Court follows
this kind of ad hoc method are laudable and necessary. They are
laudable because the Court is considering general fairness issues in
reaching a particular decision. This ad hoc approach is necessary
because Congress has not drafted its statutes carefully enough. To
apply a statute to a particular set of facts and arrive at a result, the
Court must decipher what Congress wrote. However, in altering the
statutes Congress writes, the Court raises separation of powers and
notice concerns that are as fundamental to our criminal law system as
due process.
Therefore, the Court should refrain from interpreting criminal
statutes contrary to their plain meanings. Instead, it should interpret
criminal statutes according to their plain meaning. If the plain
meaning of a statute is ambiguous and two meanings seem equally
plausible, then the Court should apply its interpretation of what the
Constitution requires for fundamental fairness and notice, and
interpret the statute in favor of the defendant. Such a method may
not be perfect, but as long as people are writing and interpreting
statutes, no method will be perfect. This quasi-plain meaning
approach has the added advantage of ensuring that potential
defendants can know what the criminal statutes prohibit before facing
convictions under those statutes.
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